In Part I, I limned Google’s current role in collecting and distributing advertising online through a series of applications it has created or acquired. I hinted pretty strongly that Google’s ultimate goal was to tap a lot more content than is currently being exploited, not only online, but also extending into video, wireless, and basically anything else you can imagine that involves the transmission of digital information.

Google’s past actions have provided some clues about the direction in which they’d like to see the media environment evolve, and by extrapolating these clues, I think we can get a rough idea of what Google’s vision of Utopia would look like. One of the biggest indicators Google has given came less than a year ago, when the terms for the American bandwidth auction were being decided. In a nutshell, a significant chunk of available bandwidth became available during the transition from analogue to digital broadcast, and the FCC was preparing to sell it off; of course, the FCC got to decide what this bandwidth would be used for (that is, whether it would be for cellphones, emergency responders, etc.) and also how it could be used. Telecommunications companies like AT&T or Verizon want strict control over their bandwidth: they essentially rent it to users like cellphone owners, and of course, they want to tell people how much they can use, what devices they can use, what content they can access, and what sort of applications they can run. They make more money if they can force users to use only their cellphones and access only their content and use only their applications.

Google petitioned the FCC, asking that at least part of the new bandwidth (C block, specifically) be designated as open to any devices consumers want to use, running any applications they want to run, accessing any content they want see, and using whatever third-party services they want to use. They also asked that a chunk be set aside to new bidders. Of course, the existing telecoms didn’t like this one bit – they not only accused Google of trying to limit competition to benefit themselves, they also tried to appeal to the FCC using the only issue that really matters: money. They tried to convince the FCC that bandwidth hobbled by such restrictive laws would be unappealing to bidders, and that it would sell for much less than unrestricted bandwidth would. Of course, this was a lie; any bandwidth is such a scarce commodity that these companies would pay whatever they had to to get it.

Still, Google pledged to bid at least $4.6 billion, as a way of ensuring that the FCC didn’t lose any money in the auction. Google was granted two of their requests: whoever bought the new bandwidth had to grant users the right to use whatever devices they want, and run whatever software they want. Verizon ultimately claimed C block (paying $4.74 billion – over $100 million more than the reserve price, putting the kibosh on the devaluation theory), and immediately started touting the benefits of an open network. Google has since admitted that they really had no intention of winning the auction, and only pledged the $4.6 billion to get the FCC to agree to a more open network. However, as Matt Buchanan at Gizmodo wrote (link above), “Verizon winning the C block pretty much kills previous utopian notions of a mythical third pipe, outside the grasp of the vested telcos, bringing glorious open internets to us all.”

This “third pipe” bringing “open internets” is exactly what Google is now most fixated on. Google’s plans to tap all the untapped content on (and off) the Internet are all predicated on their ability to bring content not just through your computer, but everywhere – your phone, your TV, your gaming system, you name it. If Google had its way, bandwidth wouldn’t belong to anyone; instead, it would be accessible to whomever was in the area and wanted to hop on. Traditional telecoms like those mentioned above have made vast fortunes by owning bandwidth and charging people a fee to access it – why would Google want to make something like this free and open to all?

Here’s a weak analogy: imagine that bandwidth is a system of roads. If you have a contract with Acme Roads Inc., you pay a monthly fee to drive on the roads owned and maintained by Acme Roads, and only those roads (also, you have to drive a car approved by Acme Roads and can only go to places of which Acme Roads approves). Obviously, this is a great deal for Acme Roads Inc. Then along comes another company, A-1 Movers Ltd. who wants all new roads to be publicly owned and operated, and who says that when we drive them we should be able to drive whatever cars we want, wherever we want, as often as we want. Acme Roads is going to have a problem with this, for sure. But while the benefit to drivers under A-1 Movers’s plan is obvious, why would A-1 Movers put up $4.6 billion dollars to have the roads opened to us? That’s a lot of money to risk, considering they don’t stand to profit from selling us cars or charging us to drive these roads. Of course, in this analogy, it turns out that A-1 Movers gets a cut of the revenue from pretty much all the theatres, cinemas, restaurants, ballparks, operas, bars, galleries, and clubs in town. Suddenly $4.6 billion to open the roads seems like a smart investment.

There’s quite a bit wrong with this analogy, I know. Very few theatres, restaurants or bars in town are actually making a profit right at the moment. And if people were permitted to drive when and where they wanted, there would be total gridlock on the roads. But imagine a future where the logistical problems have been solved – a future with nice wide roads, and where everyone eats at restaurants at every meal and goes to the movies every night – and it starts to look like a pretty nice place to live. Or to open a pub. This is the future Google sees.

[Jump to Part III]